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Abstract: This paper presents a comparative analysis of how Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania handled 
the process of nation-building, finding their self in their new reality  which was no longer created and 
manipulated by the Soviets since their breakaway from the USSR. To do so, this paper suggests an ingenious 
method of the identity politics analysis which focuses on the importance of the so-called “lieux de m￩moire” 
or “meaning-full places” for people. Monuments and statues are good examples of such places and play an 
important role in identity construction due to their ability to evoke particular kinds of feelings in people. 
Undertaking  an  in-depth  analysis  of  monuments  in  Baltic  States  provides  a  valuable  insight  on  the 
possibilities and challenges of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia to develop communities of shared values and to 
finally stop living in the shade of their “post-Sovietness”. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The decision made by the authorities of the Latvian town of Bauska, in Septemeber 2012, to 
unveil the monument commemorating "Bauska's Defenders against the Second Soviet Occupation" 
was followed by utterly emotional political debates. The Bauska’s defenders in question were the 
three  battalions  of  the  Latvian  legion  of  Waffen  SS  punitive  police.  Contrary  to  the  absolute 
absence of reaction to the event from the European Union, the reactions coming from some of the 
other countries were immediate and fierce. Belarusian representatives pointed to the fact that the 
blood of the hundreds of Belarusian partisans and civilians who were fighting against Germans was 
on the hands of Bauska defenders. The Belarusian government added that the fact that Bauska 
officials  not  only  accepted  the  construction  but  also  attended  the  opening  ceremony  was 
“particularly concerning” (Savinykh, 2012). The Russian government condemned Bauska officials 
as well as urged the European Union to respond to this event. Furthermore, Israel reacted to the 
event stating that the opening of this Monument is “insulting both to the victims of Nazism and to 
those  still  alive”  (Suharenko,  2012).  The  discontent  of  the  Jewish  community  in  Latvia  was 
especially sharp in the light of its failing attempts to get the approval for establishing a memorial for 
the Holocaust victims in Bauska; the question has been on hold for almost ten years.  
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In Estonia, during the night of 27th of April 2007 the “Bronze Soldier” was moved from the 
Tõnism￤gi hill in the centre of Tallinn to the Military Cemetery. With only a few Estonians keeping 
themselves aloof to this even, the “small” monument removal in the “small” country immediately 
appeared in the newspapers all over the world raising a wave of debates and discussions on its 
causes and effects. First of all, dismantling the monument that glorifies the Soviet liberators of 
Estonia from the Fascists became yet another apple of discord in the already complicated Russo-
Estonian  relations:  members  of  the  Russian  Federation  Council  unanimously  signed  a  note 
addressed to Vladimir Putin suggesting to react in the fiercest way possible and, if necessary, to 
sever diplomatic relations with Estonia. The dispute resulted in an economic boycott starting with 
the refusal to sell Estonian goods in the Russian supermarkets up to the suspension of investment 
projects and cessation of some oil supplies to Estonia. According to some estimates, the “Bronze 
affair” cost Estonia around EUR 450 million which stand for around 3% of the country’s GDP 
(Brilliant Fixer, 2008). 
Looking further backward, in April 2001, the Lithuanian Grūtas Park was welcoming its first 
visitors. Located only about fifty miles away from Vilnius, in the small resort of Druskininkai, this 
park imitates Soviet realities: the main roles here are played by the main leaders and heroes of the 
Soviet Union - Lenin, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky etc. Around 90 statues removed from their public sites in 
the  beginning  of  the  nineties  were  bought  by  one  of  the  Lithuanian  entrepreneurs,  Viliumas 
Malinauskas, who won the government competition for the best ideas on what to do with all those 
reminders  of  the  Soviet  past.  Notwithstanding  massive  criticism  towards  the  so-called  “Stalin 
World” bringing up unpleasant memories of the Soviet repressions in the vast number of Lithuanian 
population, Mr. Malinauskas claimed that remembering the past is crucial for Lithuanians to move 
forward. According to him, “If it [past] is brushed under the carpet, it will be unhealthy for the next 
generation.” (Coomarasamy, 1999) Despite being quite remote from the usual “touristic routes” in 
Lithuania, the park soon became one of the major touristic destinations and receives around 100,000 
visitors per year (Dokodemo Door Blog, 2012). 
These three different cases signalize that some monuments that remained from the Soviet era 
became matters of concern and central to the numerous political debates within the post-Soviet 
Baltic area. Moreover, they were often politicized and this led to the escalation of the existing 
conflicts. Nevertheless, as it has been briefly identified above, the contexts of each of these three 
cases  substantially  vary.  It  is  even  more  compelling  as  we  take  into  account  that  these  three 
countries are geographically close, have, to a great extent, common past and share a lot of social, 
economic and political similarities. Therefore, this article aims to investigate the question of what  
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monuments  and  stories  behind  them  signalize  about  the  political  identities  of  the  Baltic  States. 
Furthermore, it aims to scrutinize the differences in the nation-building processes in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania. The paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, important considerations and identification of 
choices with regard to the theory of national identity are presented. Secondly, the paper focuses on 
the specific case studies that shed light on identity formation in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it scrutinizes how the historic development, both 
before and after regained independence, is reflected in the attitude towards monuments in these 
countries and what it says about their identity politics. Finally, conclusions with regard to the posed 
questions are drawn. 
 
1.THE MONUMENTS’ ROLE IN THE “IDENTITY POLITICS” 
 
Elaborating the four-fold classification of the national identities’ theories given by Anthony 
D. Smith, this paper chooses to focus on the constructivist view of the national identity identified as 
an “elusive socially constructed and negotiated reality, something that essentially has a different 
meaning for each individual”(Wan and Vanderwerf, 2013). It is also presumed that the governments 
and the elites play a significant role in the process of shaping (and re-shaping) national identity. By 
this, it is implied that each country endeavours to establish a degree of national solidarity and unity 
among its people – the so-called nation-building. According to Bloom, successful nation-building 
can form “a clear political solidarity in relation to the external environment” and thus cannot be 
underestimated  (Bloom,  1990,  79-80).  States  do  so  through  a  variety  of  media:  high  art  and 
literature; mass communications and kitsch; architecture and monuments; ceremonies, rituals, and 
myths  (Osborne,  2001).  There  are  cases  when  specific  historical  moments  (e.g.  wars,  military 
defeats, coup d’￩tats etc.) can undermine peoples’ ever deeply held beliefs. These crises - to which 
scholars often refer as “critical junctures” - lead to rapid transformations of the political identity of 
the states and trigger the memory politics (Risse, 2010). Osborne notes a particular importance of 
specific,  “meaning-full  places”  in  this  respect.  According  to  him,  some  “places”  are  crucially 
important for peoples’ self-identification as they reinforce collective memory and “establish spatial 
and temporal reference points for society”. One of the first pioneers to analyse the importance of 
such lieux de m￩moire (places of memory) was Pierre Nora who applied it on the identity formation 
in France (Norra, 1996). Since then, a number of historians and researchers have extended his 
inquiry of how monuments and memorials have a symbolic significance for nation-building. For 
example,  Maurice  Halbwachs,  in  his  work  “On  Collective  Memory”,  stresses  the  particular  
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importance of monuments and other topographical features in the formation of collective identity 
(Halbawachs,  1992).  Anthony  D.  Smith  underlines  such  practices  of  creation  of the  feeling  of 
national  unity  and  how,  in  this  respect,  it  is  important  to  celebrate  and  commemorate  national 
heroes – people that the citizens want to identify with. According to him, there is a need to dedicate 
certain places to these heroes thus making the collective commemoration possible (Smith, 2003, 
219-53). Collective memories then help in establishing “a transcendent national experience that 
bridges awkward historical chasms and lends purpose and meaning to the forward progress of the 
nation through time.” (Roshwald 2006, 63)  
Conducting  the  analysis  of  monuments  is  important  as  the  decision  of  their 
erection/dismantling in the majority of cases lies with the government or state officials and clearly 
shows with which heroes and events state officials want their nation to identify with. Nevertheless, 
such decisions sometimes lead to the strong opposition of some parts of the community. This paper 
relies on the premise that the decisions made by governments regarding the monuments matter as 
they reveal the nature of the collective identity/identities of the nation. The way in which the state 
leads its identity politics can either open up new horizons for the unification of the national identity 
or lead to conflict, which will become a serious obstacle to the formation of an integrated identity in 
the long-run. 
When it comes to the existing studies on the monuments in the Baltic States, Estonia clearly 
has  an  upper  hand.  For  example,  Karsten  Brüggemann  and  Andres  Kasekamp  investigated  the 
challenges of Estonia’s nation-building and the importance of the Bronze Soldier’s removal in their 
article,  The  Politics  of  History  and  the  “War  of  Monuments”  in  Estonia  (Brüggemann  and 
Kasekamp, 2008). Marko Lehti, Matti Jutila and Markku Jokisipil￤ added to this analysis, claiming 
that the events of 2007 can also signalize on the ongoing shift of the Estonian narrative towards 
heroism  (Lehti,  Jutila  and  Jokisipil￤,  2008).  Stuart  Burch and  David  J.  Smith  moved  Estonia’s 
monument  wars’  analysis  to  its  eastern  border  city  of  Narva  focusing  on  the  commemoration 
practices there (Burch, Smith, 2007).   
There is a large number of studies on the conflicting views on the Soviet period in Latvia’s 
history  (e.g.  Oberl￤nder,  2009;  Dzenovska,  2005;  Rožukalne,  2010).  Sergei  Kruk  significantly 
contributed to the studies on the monuments in Latvia, analyzing both the production of statues of 
Lenin in Latvia during its Soviet period and the peculiar practices the Latvian government currently 
uses for political communication with its citizens (e.g. renaming of monuments, alterations of the 
inscriptions etc.).   
CES Working Papers –Volume VI, Issue 2A 
  98 
As for Lithuania, it is important to mention the research of Rimantas Buivydas and Almantas 
Samalavičius  on Public Spaces in Lithuanian Cities: Legacy of Dependence and Recent Tendencies 
(2011), in which they performed an important overview of the transformations of Lithuania’s public 
spaces  throughout  its  history  (since  Czarist  Russia’s  colonial  rule  up  until  the  restoration  of 
Lithuania’s independence). The above mentioned Grutas Park is often analysed in comparison to 
the Szobor Park in Hungary and its possibilities to produce the distancing effect from the Soviet 
past  (Williams  2008).  Some  scholars  tend  to  compare  such  practices  with  the  ongoing 
commemoration  of  the  victims  of  Communism  in  other  post-Communist  Eastern  European 
countries. 
It is possible to say that more and more scholars become engaged in the national identity 
studies by means of visual representation. This article, therefore, by taking into account the existing 
research on the monuments’ role in identity politics in the Baltics, aims, first of all, to fill the gap of 
comparative analyses among the three states. The focus will be put on the existing similarities and 
differences in the nation-building practices in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
 
2. ON THEIR “BALTIC WAY” TO INDEPENDENCE 
 
The last three decades were significantly important for the three Baltic countries. Having been 
“Sovietized” for almost seventy years, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania fought for their independence 
showing tremendous strength and unity. The so-called “Baltic Way” can be noted here - when 
around a million people joined hands and created a human chain of 600 km long, starting from the 
foot of Toompea in Tallinn through Riga, up to the foot of Gediminas Tower in Vilnius, demanding 
independence  and  recognition  of  the  secret  Ribbentrop-Molotov  protocol  that  determined  the 
economic, political and social development of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians for years. In the 
end, all three countries succeeded in regaining their political independence in the course of the 
Singing Revolutions. 
The common Soviet past predetermined specific problems the three countries had to deal with 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union – liberalization of its markets, changing forms of their 
political  systems.  Above  that  came  the  identity  search  and  the  problem  of  the  nation-building 
specifics. After the years of Communist propaganda, when nation-states and national identities had 
no importance in the supranational state of the Soviet Union, it was particularly hard for the states 
that experienced only brief periods of independence to launch their identity politics campaign at the  
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end of the first decade of the 20 th century1. Therefore, we can see the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union as a “critical juncture” for the three Baltic States (according to the terminology this article 
elaborates).  The  situation  was  even  more  challenging  considering  the  vast  number  of  Russian-
speakers who remained on their territories and did not necessarily share the general negative feeling 
towards their Soviet past.  What  the countries  undoubtedly shared (and had to deal with) were 
hundreds of monuments built according to Lenin’s “Monument Propaganda” plan and the necessity 
to build monuments that would play an important role in strengthening collective identity. And that 
is when “Monument Wars” began. 
 
2.1.Latvia 
 
Latvian feelings towards stones are particularly strong and have roots in pre-Christian times. 
According  to  these  traditions,  stones  are  “receptacles  of  solar  powers  and  the  forefathers’ 
knowledge” with their own personalities and souls (Kruk, 2009). This idea materialized in France in 
2005,  in  a  Latvian  design  project,  “Talking  Stones”,  during  the  Latvian  Cultural  festival, 
“Surprising Latvia”. The nine stones have human faces projected on them and each stone has a 
unique character leading its own life: they tell stories about Latvian culture, traditions and history. 
Despite  the  general  public’s  reaction  to  the  installation  that  was  quite  obscure,  the  Latvian 
government still spent around 485, 000 lats on the installation and seems eager to spend another 
150, 000 to permanently place it in the centre of Riga, making it a touristic destination (Delfi, 
2010). Nevertheless, as we will see below, the Latvian government’s “love” for stones is quite 
selective.  
Although in the early 1990s, around 80 monuments to Soviet leaders were dismantled by the 
Latvian government, there are still a few that remained. There are numerous reasons for that: firstly, 
the demolishment usually requires significant investments; secondly, it is technically complicated. 
Last but not least, the Latvian government always needs to take into account the public reaction to 
these dismantles. One of the good examples of this is the case of the removal of the monument to 
the Soviet soldiers-liberators in the Latvian town of Bauska. In August 2007, the monument was 
transferred from Korfa Park to the military cemetery. Even though local officials stated that the 
action had no political  context,  as  a matter of  fact,  it seems  that  there is  definitely something 
political to it. In fact, just like with all the others, the issue with this particular Soviet monument lies 
in history or - putting it more correctly - in its interpretation.  
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For Latvia, the establishment of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940 was an illegal 
occupation on the provisions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. By sponsoring the coup d’￩tat and 
implementing Soviet leadership in a matter of only a couple of months’ time, the Soviets imposed a 
regime of terror, arresting and deporting hundreds of people. A lot of Latvians, who managed to run 
away from NKVD, were hiding in the forests forming anti-Soviet resistance groups and joined the 
Nazis  when  Germany  attacked  the  Soviet  Union.  To  a  vast  number  of  Latvians,  there  was  no 
liberation but 3 occupations in less than ten  years: the 1940 Soviet  annexation, the 1941 Nazi 
occupation and then, yet another Soviet occupation in 1944. The Russian government regards this 
incorporation as legitimate and stresses the significant role of the Soviet Union in the liberation of 
Latvia from the Nazis. This position is generally shared by the Latvian Russophone minority which 
stands for almost one third of the total Latvia’s population. As the anti-Russian sentiment in the 
country  is  already  quite  strong,  events  such  as  the  dismantling  in  Bauska  only  complicate  the 
strained relationships between the two sides and undermine the possibilities to form a coherent 
Latvian collective identity.  
Hitherto, the main Monument to the soldiers of the Soviet Army (the “Monument to the 
Liberators of Soviet Latvia and Riga from the German Fascist Invaders”) was not dismantled and 
currently plays an important role as a gathering place for all those who revere the Great Patriotic 
War and its important dates. Nevertheless, the monument has not been well maintained and the 
inscription that used to read in Latvian and then in Russian, "For the liberators of Soviet Latvia and 
Riga", has been removed. Moreover, in 1997, the neo-Nazi groups attempted to blow up the central 
column (79 meters high) which is sometimes called “Moscow’s fingers” in Latvia (Hatlie, 2013). 
Despite all calls among the Latvian public in favour of dismantling the monument, the Latvian 
government appears to be quite hesitant when it comes to actual decision-making. Up until now, the 
Latvian government has not called to pull down the monument, stating that even though “from the 
moral  viewpoint  this  monument  deserves  being  pulled  down”  it  can  as  well  “cause  too  many 
dangerous consequences” (The Voice of Russia, 2012). It is important to stress that the current 
Latvian government acknowledges its obligation to provide for the preservation of the monument as 
it is subject to Intergovernmental Agreement between Latvia and Russia on the social protection of 
military pensioners residing on the territory of the republic of Latvia and their family members. 
This  agreement  has  been  in  force  since  1994  and,  among  other  things,  it  provides  for  the 
“preservation and maintenance of commemorative structures and mass burial sites” (Embassy of the 
Republic of Latvia). Therefore, the prospect of tearing down the monument is regarded to be a 
violation of this agreement.   
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It is important to stress again that the crux of the problem in the majority of cases is not about 
life under the Soviet regime, but about the role of Soviets in the fight against Fascism in the Baltic 
States.  This  question  still  remains  remaining  a  sensitive  issue  to  all  those  for  whom  the  Great 
Patriotic War can have no “additional” interpretation. Addressing this question via these post-Soviet 
era monuments has no potential in laying the foundations for future consensus and is, therefore, of 
no help in integrating the Latvian community or reshaping the national identity as “free from the 
past”.  Recent  events  in  Bauska  such  as  the  erection  of  the  monument  to  Waffen  SS  legion  - 
mentioned in the introduction of this article - show that the government should not underestimate 
the gravity of its possible impacts on the society; it tends to only intensify the “understanding” gap 
in the community.  
There are some other ways in which the Latvian government conducts their memory politics. 
For  example,  the  famous  Monument  of  Red  Latvian  Riflemen,  located  in  the  main  square  of 
Ratslaukums in Riga, survived the numerous debates on its Communist symbolism and was not torn 
down.  Nonetheless,  it  also  lost  its  “Redness”  being  renamed  to  the  “Monument  to  Latvian 
Riflemen”. Moreover, the Museum of Red Latvian Riflemen, built together with the monument in 
the Ratslaukums Square, started to serve as a Museum of Occupation with a declared mission to 
“commemorate the wrongdoings committed by the foreign occupation powers against the state and 
the people of Latvia from 1940 to 1991” (Mission and History, 2013). Furthermore, there are the 
ongoing debates of opening another monument in the same square with a non-communist meaning 
(Kruk, 2009). 
A monument that is forsooth playing a special symbolic role for Latvians is the Freedom 
Monument. Standing in the very heart of Riga, the monument is a column on which a Latvian 
woman stands, lifting three stars skyward. The monument was unveiled to honour soldiers killed 
during the Latvian War of Independence in 1935 in the short period when Latvia was free of foreign 
rule (1920-1940). Miraculously having survived the years of Soviet rule, the monument became 
particularly important for Latvia’s political identity since it links the modern period of Latvian 
independence  with  its  independence  in  the  interwar  period.  The  current  common  view  of  the 
monument as a symbol of independence from the Soviet regime is a successful example of identity 
politics when the government can invoke the national spirit in people by linking to a time period 
which is not related to the Soviet regime. 
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2.2. Estonia  
 
The problem of interpretation of the Soviet period history refers as much to Estonia as to 
Latvia. The Estonian government continuously demands recognition of the illegal incorporation of 
Estonia into the Soviet Union after its short period of independence (1918 -1940). Furthermore, it 
condemns any positive representation of the Soviet rule and puts it together with Nazism as being 
one of the biggest evils in the Estonian history. In fact, the evils of Communism are seen by some 
groups to be greater than those of Nazism. In 2004, in the western town of Lihula, approximately 
2,000 people attended the unveiling ceremony of the monument to those who fought together with 
the Nazis against Bolshevism (BBC, 2011). The opening ceremony immediately elicited strong 
international  criticism,  notably,  by  Russia,  the  European  Union  and  Jewish  communities.  The 
reaction  of  the  Estonian  society  was  controversial  itself.  The  negative  reaction  of  the  Russian 
minority in Estonia (about 25% of the total population) was backed by the Estonian Government 
that, possibly under the pressure of the EU, called the unveiling a ‘provocation’ and decided to 
remove the monument. The removal, however, caused massive protests in Lihula and the monument 
was successfully removed only with the help of the police and use of teargas (Lauri, 2002). 
The consequences of the infamous monument affair mentioned in the introduction of this 
paper - the removal of the Bronze Soldier from Tõnism￤gi in central Tallinn – were even fiercer, 
going as far as imposing economic sanctions on Estonia. These events also raised concern about the 
possible revival of neo-Nazi groups in Estonia and its consequences on the Russophone minority.  
One might find it also interesting to look at the legal perspective of the removal. Initially 
under the jurisdiction of the Tallinn City Council, which showed no serious intentions to relocate 
the statue, the Bronze Soldier removal was possible mainly due to the activities of the Reform Party 
Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. In the beginning of 2014, he succeeded in pushing two major bills in 
the Estonian Parliament - War Graves Protection Act (signed on January 10, 2007) and Law on 
Forbidden  Structures  (approved  on  February  15,  2007).  The  former  bills  gave  the  right  to  the 
Parliament to overrule local governments in the decisions concerning monuments if such measures 
were to “ensure the honouring and dignified handling of the remains of the persons killed in the 
military  action  on  the  Estonian  territory”  (Riigikogu  Press  Service,  2007).  The  latter  aimed  at 
prohibiting the public display of monuments that would glorify the years of Soviet rule in Estonia. 
Although  President  Toomas  Hendrik Ilves  vetoed  the  Law  on  Forbidden  Structures  as  anti-
Constitutional, the War Graves Protection Act was still enough to dismantle the monument and 
have it moved to the Defence Forces cemetery. The case of the Bronze Soldier is significant, clearly  
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showing that Estonia went yet another step forward from Latvia and it was the state’s decision to 
relocate  the  monument  which  is  symbolic  for  a  vast  number  of  the  country’s  population  who 
commemorates the Great Patriotic War.  
Another example of identity politics is the case of the restoration of the “Swedish  Lion” 
monument in the eastern border city of Narva. The monument filled the place where once Lenin’s 
monument stood but was then dismantled. Received as a present from Sweden, it commemorates 
the Battle of Narva and Sweden’s victory over Russia. Stuart Burch and David J. Smith, in their 
article Empty Spaces and the Value of Symbols: Estonia’s ‘War of Monuments’ from Another Angle 
(2007), argue that despite the common fears that such gesture would trigger a furious reaction in 
such a city as Narva, where the absolute majority (82%) of the population are Russian by ethnicity, 
the result was quite opposite. It showed that Estonia’s Russians, despite “looking to the heritage of 
the Tsarist Russian rule” also see the Swedish Lion as a legitimate symbol of their city (Burch, 
Smith, 2007). The idea of the importance of their town in the course of the Great Northern War - 
keeping in mind that Sweden was, in the end, defeated – is appealing to the Narvitians. As for the 
government of Estonia, the connection to the Swedish past - the “Golden Age” of Estonian history - 
is momentous in the light of the growing engagement of Sweden in Estonia. Therefore, despite the 
fact that “Russian” and “Estonian” perspectives on the Great Northern War are different, it can still 
be seen as a successful “discussion of the past” (Burch, Smith, 2007). There are, of course, limits to 
this success. The followed proposals of Narvitians to erect a statue of Peter the Great in the city 
stumbled across the rejection of the Estonian government. Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip 
expressed his strong disapproval of the idea, arguing that this erection would be as a “spit in the 
face”  of  Estonia’s  inter-war  leaders  who  spent  a  lot  of  effort  to  remove  other  Peter  the  Great 
monuments.  Hence,  the  Estonian  self-identification  is  strongly  linked  to  that  short  period  of 
Estonian self-rule and such a controversial act of going against the leaders of that period simply 
cannot be negotiated. 
The urge to incorporate Estonian “Scandinavian-ness” can also be seen in the analysis of the 
War of Independence Victory Column. In 2005, Riigikogu launched a design competition of a 
monument  that  would  commemorate  thousands  of  people  who  died  during  Estonia’s  War  of 
Independence, 1918-1920. The glass monument incorporates the Cross of Liberty – an Estonian 
special award established in 1919. The style of the award itself has been inspired by Finland’s 
Order of the Cross of Liberty. The use of a cross is also important in terms of the ongoing debates 
on whether the Estonian flag should be changed from tricolour to the Scandinavian-cross design. 
The idea was proposed in 2001 by an Estonian politician, Kaarel Tarand, and generally shows the  
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importance of the country’s connections to the Nordic countries and its self-portraying rather as 
“Nordic” than “Baltic”. 
 
2.3. Lithuania 
 
While in Estonia and Latvia we see irrefutable attempts to get rid of everything in the public 
spaces that could bring up unpleasant Soviet memories, the case of Lithuania is somehow different. 
On the one hand, here, as in the rest of post-Soviet countries, a lot of monuments to Lenin and other 
Soviet figures were demolished right after the dissolution (with the majority of the monuments to 
Stalin torn off during the Khrushchev’s policy of de-Stalinization). On the other hand, the country - 
making up to 50 years of political dependence – started reconstructing monuments that the Soviets 
tried to get rid of. One of the first was the Three Crosses Monument that was built in 1916 but 
blown up under the order of Kremlin in 1950. The story of the Crosses goes back to the 17th century 
and until 1869 similar wooden crosses stood on the same place (Hill of Three Crosses in the Kalnų 
Park). 
The rich history of Lithuania goes back to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, one of the largest 
countries in the 14th century Europe. The Grand Duchy covered the territories of the present day 
Belarus, some parts of Ukraine, Russia and Poland and formally existed until the end of the 18th 
century. Lithuania also formed a voluntary two-state union with Poland – the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth – that was established in 1569 and existed until the Third Partition of Poland in 
1795. Therefore, Lithuania had a far richer independent history than her Baltic neighbours and did 
not have to reassert her identity by only linking it to the interwar period of independence. History 
also explains the strong ties with Poland, which are extremely important to Lithuanians until today. 
After  the  re-establishment  of  its  independence,  Lithuania  erected  a  number  of  monuments  to 
commemorate its history. The monument to the Grand Duke Gediminas, who ruled from 1316 to 
1341,  was  erected  in  1996.  Gediminas  is  known  to  be  one  of  the  most  significant  figures  in 
Lithuanian  history  and  is  also  called  “the  founder”,  as  it  was  under  his  rule  that  Lithuania 
tremendously expanded its territory. Lithuanians similarly erected monuments to Mindaugas (the 
first  King  of  Lithuania)  and  Barbora  Radvilaitė  (the  Queen  of  the  Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth). 
Another  significant  difference  between  Lithuania  and  its  Baltic  neighbours  resides  in  its 
success in preserving its language and successfully resisting Russification by both Tsarist Russia 
and the Soviet occupation periods. The Russians who resided in Lithuania after the World War II  
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are said to be successfully integrated into Lithuania; the Russian minority here is not as numerous 
as in Latvia and Estonia and counts for less than 6%.  
Lithuania’s  extensive  history  of  freedom  and  independence,  its  language  and  culture  - 
corroborated to its strong affiliation to Poland - all contribute to the representation of Lithuania as a 
Central European country with its role as a bridge between East and West. The country’s aspirations 
were proven in 1989 by the estimations made by National France Geography institute according to 
which  the  unassailable  geographic  centre  of  Europe  is  located  in  the  Lithuanian  village  of 
Purnuškiai,  just  26  kilometres  north  from  Vilnius.  In  2004,  symbolically,  the  year  of  its  EU 
accession, Lithuania erected a monument with the white granite pillar with a crown of stars on the 
top. Hereby, the country’s European-ness obtained a monumental representation. 
The Lithuanian support for the opening of an outdoor museum of Grūtas Park shows a unique 
manner  in  which  the  country  decided  to  deal  with  its  controversial  Communist  past.  Some 
Lithuanians criticize Grūtas Park saying that it is an imitation of the Soviet gulag, with an extensive 
collection of Soviet monuments and other attributes bringing up painful memories of the times of 
occupation.  Nevertheless,  the  proponents  of  the  park  agree  with  the  project  founder,  Viliumas 
Malinauskas, when stating that the park’s role is crucial as it ridicules the Soviet Union and helps to 
“understand  what  dictatorships  are  capable  of  and  what  tools  they  use  to  brainwash  people” 
(Harrison,  2000).  Rather  than  destroying  or  locking  the  monuments  up  in  some  warehouses, 
Lithuanians have chosen to rather acknowledge their past, to put it behind them, and move forward. 
Lithuania  was  also  the  only  Baltic  country  that  created  a  monument  commemorating  the 
solidarity of the Baltic countries during the restoration of their independence in 1989. “The Road of 
Freedom” is a monument glorifying the live chain of people that joined their hands in a “Baltic 
Way”, therefore demanding the acknowledgment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the end of 
occupation. The sculpture is a collective creation – people could contribute to the Project and get a 
brick  with  his/her  name  stamped  on  it.  Lithuania,  hence,  became  the  first  country  which 
monumentalized the recent past of its people and their non-violent resistance towards the Soviets. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Breaking away from the Soviet Union together with the longed-for independence imposed a 
number of significant challenges on the former Soviet Baltic Republics. Being multiethnic, all the 
countries needed to undergo the nation-building process and, therefore, shape their identity politics. 
This paper builds on the concept that visual representations play an important role in the process of  
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a  person’s  identification  with  particular  “lieux  de  m￩moire”.  Monuments  can  evoke  specific 
feelings in people and therefore reveal a lot about the collective identity of some groups of people. 
The governments that face a problem in introducing a successful identity policy often use the tool of 
destruction/erection of monuments in order to shape the self-image and, more importantly, to deal 
with its past. In doing so, governments can face specific problems when these acts clash with some 
fundamental beliefs, some postulates of the collective identities of specific groups. The creation of a 
coherent identity is often doomed as it might only deepen the gap of misunderstanding between the 
groups.  
The analysis of the development of Baltic States shows that, despite some features that these 
countries  share  (geographic  position,  history  of  several  occupations  in  the  20th  century,  re-
establishment of the independence followed by introduction of pro-Western foreign policies), their 
similarity in terms of their political identities is more complicated. Similarity can be found between 
Estonia  and  Latvia,  where  the  “Monument  Wars”  have  constantly  revealed  the  high  degree  of 
misunderstanding and incoherence between the various collective identities. A reason for that lies in 
the interpretation of history, more specifically, in the question of the role of the Soviets in the Great 
Patriotic War and the incorporation of states into the Union. The ongoing “memory wars” result in 
the attempts of the governments to cross out everything connecting them to the Soviet years from 
the public sites. These acts evoke indignation and strong condemnation among those who share a 
special feeling of attachment to these sites; thus, the countries lack in the ability to put the past 
behind and move into the modern period of their policies. Although none of the monuments that 
were described in the present article was subject of the UNESCO heritage protection programs, the 
case of the Bronze Soldier showed how the Government was keen to even change national laws in 
order to proceed with the removal. In Latvia, the removal of the Victory Memorial would require 
the same actions and this leaves Latvian government hesitating under the pressures of both – the 
part of the nation that equates the Soviet period of its history with occupation and those Russophone 
groups who still revere the Great Patriotic War.  
When it comes to Lithuania, on the other hand, the “monument war” never broke out and 
even  though  the  opening  of  the  Grūtas  Park  left  a  lot  of  people  in  Lithuania  discontent,  its 
placement (far from the city centre, in the village) together with an argument that the main idea is 
too  ridicule  not  to  glorify  the  Soviet  Union,  promises  no  further  conflicts  around  the  park. 
Moreover,  the  Park  symbolizes  that  a  lot  of  Lithuanians  are  eager  to  acknowledge  their 
controversial past and move on to the phase of reconciliation.   
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There are also some specific remarks that can be derived from the monument analysis in the 
Baltic  States.  Examples  of  the  Swedish  Lion  monument  in  Narva  and  the  cross -shaped  War  of 
Independence  Victory  Column  in  Tallinn  reveal  the  attempts  to  promote  and strengthen  the 
country’s Nordic identity. At the same time, Lithuania accentuates its Central European-ness and 
puts a special stress on her relations with Poland, opening monuments that could remind its citizens 
of their country’s rich cultural heritage and diverse history that goes back to the  13th century. 
It is necessary to acknowledge and point out one limitation of the present research, namely, 
the number of the cases that have been investigated in this paper. Though carefully selecting and 
focusing on the most representative examples of the torn down/erected monuments, this analysis 
would benefit from an expansion of the number of cases. However, it is important to stress that the 
main aim of the article is to contribute to the existing studies suggesting an ingenious method of 
identity  politics  analysis.  Through  the  comparison  of  the  attitude  towards  the  post-Soviet 
monuments in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania and the study of the monuments built in the new period 
of  their  independence,  this  paper  showed  and  proved  that  even  “stone”  can  bring  us  closer  to 
understanding some aspects of the complexity of identity transformation. The analysis of the ways 
in which these seemingly stationary items are treated in each country should carry on as it can only 
enrich the existing research of the past and current issues of the Baltic States development. 
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